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Introduction
Most models of decisionmaking under uncertainty describe a decision environment with a set of states and a set of outcomes. Objects of choice are acts, functions from states to outcomes. The decision maker (DM) holds a preference relation on the set of all such functions. Representation theorems characterize those preference relations with utility functions on acts that separate (more or less) tastes on outcomes from beliefs on states. The canonical example is Savage's (1954) characterization of those preference relations that have a subjective expected utility (SEU) representation: Acts are ranked by the expectation of a utility payoff on their outcomes with respect to a probability distribution on states. Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989 ) maintains the separation between tastes and beliefs, but does not require that beliefs be represented by an additive measure. Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) cumulative prospect theory relaxes the taste-belief separation by assessing gains and losses with different belief measures; Wakker and Tversky (1993) discuss generalizations of SEU from this point of view. Modern attempts to represent ambiguity in choice theory relax both the meaning of likelihood and the separation of tastes and beliefs that characterize SEU. All of these generalizations of SEU, however, maintain the state-outcome-act description of objects of choice and, moreover, take this description of choice problems as being given prior to the consideration of any preference notion.
We, on the other hand, follow Ellsberg (2001) in locating the source of ambiguity in the description of the problem. For Savage (1954, p. 9) , the world is 'the object about which the person is concerned' and a state of the world is 'a description of the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed.' But what are the 'relevant' descriptors of the world? Choices do not come equipped with states. Instead they are typically objects described by their manner of realization, such as 'buy 100 shares of IBM' or 'leave the money in the bank,' 'attack Iraq,' or 'continue to negotiate.' In Savage's account (1954, sec. 2.3) it is clear that the DM 'constructs the states' in contemplating the decision problem. In fact, his discussion of the rotten egg foreshadows this process. Subsequently, traditional decision theory has come to assume that states are given as part of the description of the decision problem. We suppose instead that states are constructed by the DM in the course of deliberating about questions such as 'How is choice A different from choice B?' and 'In what circumstances will choice A turn out better than choice B?'. These same considerations apply (although here Savage may disagree) to outcomes. This point has been forcefully made by Weibull (2004) .
There are numerous papers in the literature that raise issues with the statespace approach of Savage or that derive a subjective state space. Machina (2006) surveys the standard approach and illustrates many difficulties with the theory and with its uses. These difficulties include the ubiquitous ambiguity over whether the theory is meant to be descriptive or normative, whether states are exogenous or constructed by the DM, whether states are external to the DM, and whether they are measurable or not. Kreps (1992) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) use a menu choice model to deal with unforeseen contingencies-an inability of the DM to list all possible states of the world. They derive a subjective state space that represents possible preference orders over elements of the menu chosen by the DM. Ghirardato (2001) takes an alternative approach to unforeseen contingencies and models acts as correspondences from a state space to outcomes. Gilboa and Schmeidler (2004) and Karni (2006) raise objections to the state space that are similar to ours and develop decision theories without a state space. Both papers derive subjective probabilities directly on outcomes. Ahn (2007) also develops a theory without a state space; in his theory, the DM chooses over sets of lotteries over consequences. Ahn and Ergin (2007) allow for the possibility that there may be different descriptions of a particular event, and use this possibility to capture framing. For them, a 'description' is a partition of the state space. They provide an axiomatic foundation for decision making in this framework, built on Tversky and Koehler's (1994) notion of support theory.
Our approach differs significantly from these mentioned above. The inspiration for our approach is the observation that objects of choice in an uncertain world have some structure to them. Individuals choose among some simple actions: 'buy 100 shares of IBM' or 'attack Iraq'. But they also perform various tests on the world and make choices contingent upon the outcome of these tests: 'If the stock broker recommends buying IBM, then buy 100 shares of IBM; otherwise buy 100 shares of Google.' These tests are written in a fixed language (which we assume is part of the description of the decision problem, just as Savage assumed that states were part of the description of the decision problem). The language is how the DM describes the world. We formalize this viewpoint by taking the objects of choice to be (syntactic) programs in a programming language.
The programming language is very simple-we use it just to illustrate our ideas. Critically, it includes tests (in the context of if . . . then . . . else statements). These tests involve syntactic descriptions of the events in the world, and allow us to distinguish events from (syntactic) descriptions of events. In particular, there can be two different descriptions that, intuitively, describe the same event from the point of view of the modeler but may describe different events from the point of view of the decision maker. Among other things, this enables us to capture framing effects in our framework, without requiring states as Ahn and Ergin (2007) do, and provides a way of dealing with resource-bounded reasoners.
In general, we do not include outcomes as part of the description of the decision problem; both states and outcomes are part of the DM's (subjective) representation of the problem. We assume that the DM has a weak preference relation on the objects of choice; we do not require the preference relation to be complete. The set of acts for a decision problem is potentially huge, and may contain acts that will never be considered by the DM. While we believe that empirical validity requires considering partial orders, there are also theoretical reasons for considering partial orders. Our representation theorems for partial orders require a set of probabilities and utility functions (where often one of the sets can be taken to be a singleton). Schmeidler (1989, p. 572) observes that using a set of probability distributions can be taken as a measure of a DM's lack of confidence in her likelihood assessments. Similarly, a set of utilities can be interpreted as a lack of confidence in her taste assessments (perhaps because she has not had time to think them through carefully).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin the next section with a description of the syntactic programs that we take as our objects of choice, discuss several interpretations of the model, and show how syntactic programs can be interpreted as Savage acts. In Section 3, we present our assumptions on preferences The key postulate is an analogue of Krantz et al.'s (1971) cancellation axiom. In Section 4 we present our representation theorems for decision problems with subjective outcomes and those with objective outcomes. Section 5 discusses how our framework can model boundedly rational reasoning. In Section 6 we discuss how updating works for new information about the external world as well as for new information about preferences. Section 7 concludes.
Describing Choices
We begin by describing the language of tests, and then use this language to construct our syntactic objects of choice. We then use the language of tests to describe theories of the world. We show how framing problems can be understood as 'odd' theories held by decision makers.
Languages for tests and choices
A primitive test is a yes/no question about the world, such as, 'IBM's price-earnings ratio is 5', 'the economy will be strong next year' and 'the moon is in the seventh house'. We assume a finite set T 0 of primitive tests. The set T of tests is constructed by closing the set of primitive tests under conjunction and negation. That is, T is the smallest set such that T 0 ⊆ T , and if t 1 and t 2 are in T , so is t 1 ∧ t 2 and ¬t 1 . Thus, the language of tests is just a propositional logic whose atomic propositions are the elements of T 0 .
We consider two languages for choices. In both cases, we begin with a finite set A 0 of primitive choices. These may be objects such as 'buy 100 shares of IBM' or 'buy $10,000 worth of bonds'. The interpretation of these acts is tightly bound to the decision problem being modeled. The first language simply closes off A 0 under if . . . then . . . else. By this we mean that if t is a test in T and a and b are choices in A, then if t then a else b is also a choice in A. When we need to be clear about which T 0 and A 0 were used to construct A, we will write A A 0 ,T 0 . Note that A allows nesting, so that if t 1 then a else (if t 2 then b else c) is also a choice.
The second languages closes off A 0 with if . . . then . . . else and randomization. That is, we assume that objective probabilities are available, and require that for any 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, if a and b are choices, so is ra + (1 − r)b. Randomization and if . . . then . . . else can be nested in arbitrary fashion. We call this language A
Tests in T are elements of discourse about the world. They could be events upon which choice is contingent: If the noon price of Google stock today is below $600, then buy 100 shares, else buy none. More generally, tests in T are part of the DM's description of the decision problem, just as states are part of the description of the decision problem in Savage's framework. However, elements of T need not be complete descriptions of the relevant world, and therefore may not correspond to Savage's states. When we construct state spaces, elements of T will clearly play a role in defining states, but, for some of our representation theorems, states cannot be constructed out of elements of T alone. Additional information in states is needed for both incompleteness of preferences and when the outcome space is taken to be objective or exogenously given.
The choices in A and A + are syntactic objects; strings of symbols. They can be given semantics-that is, they can be interpreted-in a number of ways. For most of this paper we focus on one particular way of interpreting them that lets us connect them to Savage acts, but we believe that other semantic approaches will also prove useful (see Section 7). The first step in viewing choices as Savage acts is to construct a state space S, and to interpret the tests as events (subsets of S). 
Intuitively, π S (t) is the set of states where t is true. We will allow for nonstandard interpretations. These are interpretations in which, for some test t, there may be some state where neither t nor ¬t is true; that is, there may be some state in neither π S (t) nor π S (¬t)); similarly, there may be some state where both t and ¬t are true. Such nonstandard interpretations are essentially what philosophers call 'impossible possible worlds' (Rantala 1982) ; they have also been used in game theory for modeling resource-bounded reasoning (Lipman 1999) . A standard interpretation is completely determined by its behavior on primitive tests. This is not true of nonstandard interpretations. All test interpretations are assumed to be standard until Section 5. There we motivate nonstandard interpretations, and show how our results can be modified to hold even with them. 
This semantics captures the idea of contingent choices; that, in the choice if t then a 1 else a 2 , the realization of a 1 is contingent upon t, while a 2 is contingent upon 'not t'. Of course, a 1 and a 2 could themselves be compound acts.
Extending the semantics to the language A + , given S, O, and π S , requires us to associate with each choice a an Anscombe-Aumann (AA) act (Anscombe and Aumann 1963) , that is, a function from S to probability measures on O. Let ∆(O) denote the set of probability measures on O and let ∆ * (O) be the subset of ∆(O)
consisting of the probability measures that put probability one on an outcome. Let
S be a choice interpretation for primitive choices that assigns to each a o ∈ A 0 a function from S → ∆ * (O). 
That is, the distribution ρ SO (ra 1 + (1 − r)a 2 )(s) is the obvious mixture of the distributions ρ SO (a 1 )(s) and ρ SO (a 2 )(s). Note that we require ρ SO to associate with each primitive choice in each state a single outcome (technically, a distribution that assigns probability 1 to a single outcome), rather than an arbitrary distribution over outcomes. So primitive choices are interpreted as Savage acts, and more general choices, which are formed by taking objective mixtures of choices, are interpreted as AA acts. This choice is largely a matter of taste. We would get similar representation theorems even if we allowed ρ 0 SO to be an arbitrary function from A to ∆(O)
S . However, this choice does matter for our interpretation of the results; see Example 11 for further discussion of this issue.
Framing and equivalence
Framing problems appear when a DM solves inconsistently two decision problems that are designed by the modeler to be equivalent or that are obviously similar after recognizing an equivalence. The fact that choices are syntactic objects allows us to capture framing effects.
Example 1. Consider the following well-known example of the effects of framing, due to McNeil et al. (1982) . DMs are asked to choose between surgery or radiation therapy as a treatment for lung cancer. The problem is framed in two ways. In the what is called the survival frame, DMs are told that, of 100 people having surgery, 90 live through the post-operative period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year, and 34 are alive at the end of five years; and of 100 people have radiation therapy, all live through the treatment, 77 are alive at the end of the first year, and 22 are alive at the end of five years. In the mortality frame, DMs are told that of 100 people having surgery, 10 die during the post-operative period, 32 die by the end of the first year, and 66 die by the end of five years; and of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during the treatment, 23 die by the end of the first year, and 78 die by the end of five years. Inspection shows that the outcomes are equivalent in the two frames-90 of 100 people living is the same as 10 out of 100 dying, and so on. Although one might have expected the two groups to respond to the data in similar fashion, this was not the case. While only 18% of DMs prefer radiation therapy in the survival frame, the number goes up to 44% in the mortality frame.
We can represent this example in our framework as follows. We assume that we have the following tests:
• RT , which intuitively represents '100 people have radiation therapy';
• S, which intuitively represents '100 people have surgery';
• L i (k), for i = 0, 1, 5 and k = 0, . . . , 100, which intuitively represents that k out of 100 people live through the post-operative period (if i = 0), are alive after the first year (if i = 1), and are alive after five years (if i = 5);
• D i (k), for i = 0, 1, 5 and k = 0, . . . , 100, which is like L i (k), except 'live/alive' are replaced by 'die/dead'.
In addition, we assume that we have primitive programs a S and a R that represent 'perform surgery' and 'perform radiation theory'. With these tests, we can characterize the description of the survival frame by the following test t 1 :
(where, as usual, t ⇒ t ′ is an abbreviation for ¬(t ∧ ¬t ′ )); similarly, the mortality frame is characterized by the following test t 2 : where a is an arbitrary choice. Intuitively, comparing these choices forces the DM to consider his preferences between a S and a R conditional on the test, since the outcome in these two choices is the same if the test does not hold. Similarly, the mortality frame amounts to a decision problem with the analogous choices with t 1 replaced by t 2 .
There is nothing in our framework that forces a DM to identify the tests t 1 and t 2 ; the tests L i (k) and D i (100 − k) a priori are completely independent, even if the problem statement suggests that they should be equivalent. Hence there is no reason for a DM to identify the choices if t 1 then a S else a and if t 2 then a S else a. As a consequence, as we shall see, it is perfectly consistent with our axioms that a DM has the preferences if t 1 then a S else a ≻ if t 1 then a R else a and if t 2 then a R else a ≻ if t 2 then a S else a.
We view it as a feature of our framework that it can capture this framing example for what we view as the right reason: the fact that DMs do not necessarily identify L i (k) and D i (100 − k). Nevertheless, we would also like to be able to capture the fact that more sophisticated DMs do recognize the equivalence of these tests. We can do this by associating with a DM her understanding of the relationship between tests. For example, a sophisticated DM might understand that 
Denote by Π AX the set of all standard interpretations that respect theory AX. Then Π AX -equivalent a and b are said to be AX-equivalent, and we write a ≡ AX b. Note that equivalence is defined relative to a given set Π of interpretations. Two choices may be equivalent with respect to the set of all standard interpretations that hold a particular test t to be true, but not equivalent to the larger set of all standard test interpretations.
The Axioms
This section lays out our basic assumptions on preferences. Since our basic framework allows for preferences only on discrete sets of objects, we cannot use conventional independence axioms. Instead, we use cancellation. Cancellation axioms are not well known, so we use this opportunity to derive some connections between cancellation and more familiar preference properties.
Preferences
We assume that the DM has a weak preference relation on a subset C of the sets A (resp., A + ) of non-randomized (resp., randomized) acts. This weak preference relation has the usual interpretation of 'at least as good as'. We take a ≻ b to be an abbreviation for a b and b a, even if is not complete. We prove various representation theorems that depend upon the language, and upon whether outcomes are taken to be given or not. The engines of our analysis are various cancellation axioms, which are the subject of the next section. At some points in our analysis we consider complete preferences:
A1. The preference relation is complete.
The completeness axiom has often been defended by the claim that 'people, in the end, make choices.' Nonetheless, from the outset of modern decision theory, completeness has been regarded as a problem. Savage (1954, Section 2.6 ) discusses the difficulties involved in distinguishing between indifference and incompleteness. He concludes by choosing to work with the relationship he describes with the symbol ≦ · , later abbreviated as ≤, which he interprets as 'is not preferred to'. The justification of completeness for the 'is not preferred to' relationship is anti-symmetry of strict preference. Savage, Aumann (1962) , Bewley (2002) and Mandler (2001) argue against completeness as a requirement of rationality. Eliaz and Ok (2006) have argued that rational choice theory with incomplete preferences is consistent with preference reversals. In our view, incompleteness is an important expression of ambiguity in its plain meaning (rather than as a synonym for a non-additive representation of likelihood). There are many reasons why a comparison between two objects of choice may fail to be resolved: obscurity or indistinctness of their properties, lack of time for or excessive cost of computation, the incomplete enumeration of a choice set, and so forth. We recognize indecisiveness in ourselves and others, so it would seem strange not to allow for it in any theory of preferences that purports to describe tastes (as opposed to a theory which purports to characterize consistent choice).
Cancellation
Axioms such as the independence axiom or the sure thing principle are required to get the requisite linearity for an SEU representation. But in their usual form these axioms cannot be stated in our framework as they place restrictions on preference relations over acts and we do not have acts. Moreover, some of our representation theorems apply to finite sets of acts, while the usual statement of mixture axioms requires a mixture space of acts. For us, the role of these axioms is performed by the cancellation axiom, which we now describe. Although simple versions of the cancellation axiom have appeared in the literature (e.g. Scott (1964) and Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971) ), it is nonetheless not well known, and so before turning to our framework we briefly explore some of its implications in more familiar settings. Nonetheless, some of the results here are new; in particular, the results on cancellation for partial orders. These will be needed for proofs in the appendix.
Let C denote a set of choices and a preference relation on C. We use the following notation: Suppose a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n are sequences of elements of C. If for all c ∈ C, #{j : a j = c} = #{j : b j = c}, we write {{a 1 , . . . a n }} = {{b 1 , . . . , b n }}. That is, the multisets formed by the two sequences are identical.
Definition 5 (Cancellation).
The preference relation on C satisfies cancellation iff for all pairs of sequences a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n of elements of C such that {{a 1 , . . . , a n }} = {{b 1 , . . . ,
Roughly speaking, cancellation says that if two collections of choices are identical, then it is impossible to order the choices so as to prefer each choice in the first collection to the corresponding choice in the second collection. The following proposition shows that cancellation is equivalent to reflexivity and transitivity. Although Krantz et al. (1971 , p. 251), Fishburn (1987 have observed that cancellation implies transitivity, this full characterization appears to be new.
Proposition 1.
A preference relation on a choice set C satisfies cancellation iff 1.
is reflexive, and 2. is transitive.
Proof. First suppose that cancellation holds. To see that is reflexive, take n = 1 and a 1 = b 1 = a in the cancellation axiom. The hypothesis of the cancellation axiom clearly holds, so we must have a a. To see that cancellation implies transitivity, consider the pair of sequences a, b, c and b, c, a . Cancellation clearly applies. If a b and b c, then cancellation implies a c. We defer the proof of the converse to the Appendix.
We use two strengthenings of cancellation in our representation theorems for A and A + , respectively. The first, statewise cancellation, simply increases the set of sequence pairs to which the conclusions of the axiom must apply. This strengthening is required for the existence of additively separable preference representations when choices have a factor structure. Here we state the condition for Savage acts. Given are finite sets S of states and O of outcomes. A Savage act is a map f : S → O. Let C denote a set of Savage acts and suppose that is a preference relation on C.
Definition 6 (Statewise Cancellation). The preference relation
on a set C of Savage acts satisfies statewise cancellation iff for all pairs of sequences a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n of elements of C, if {{a 1 (s), . . . , a n (s)}} = {{b 1 (s), . . . , b n (s)}} for all s ∈ S, and a i b i for i ≤ n − 1, then b n a n . for all acts a, b, c, and c ′ and subsets T of the state space S,
Proposition 2. If satisfies statewise cancellation, then satisfies event independence.
Proposition 1 provides a provides a characterization of cancellation for choices in terms of familiar properties of preferences. We do not have a similarly simple characterization of statewise cancellation. In particular, the following example shows that it is not equivalent to the combination of reflexivity and transitivity of and event independence.
There are nine possible acts. Suppose that is the smallest reflexive, transitive relation such that
using the representation of acts described above. To see that satisfies event independence, note that
However, statewise cancellation does not hold. Consider the sequences
This pair of sequences clearly satisfies the hypothesis of statewise cancellation, that
For our representation theorems for complete orders, statewise cancellation suffices. However, for partial orders, we need a version of cancellation that is equivalent to statewise cancellation in the presence of A1, but is in general stronger. 
Definition 7 (Extended Statewise Cancellation
Proposition 3. In the presence of A1, extended statewise cancellation and statewise cancellation are equivalent.
Proof. Suppose the hypotheses of extended statewise cancellation hold. If b n a n , we are done. If not, by A1, a n b n . But then the hypotheses of statewise cancellation hold, so again, b n a n .
The extension of cancellation needed for A + is based on the same idea as extended statewise cancellation, but probabilities of objects rather than the incidences of objects are added up. Let C denote a collection of elements from a finite-dimensional mixture space. Thus, C can be viewed as a subspace of R n for some n, and each component of any c ∈ C is a probability. We can then formally 'add' elements of C, adding elements of R n pointwise. (Note that the result of adding two elements in C is no longer an element of C, and in fact is not even a mixture.)
Definition 8 (Extended Mixture Cancellation). The preference relation
on C satisfies extended mixture cancellation iff for all pairs of sequences a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n of elements of C, such that
We can extend Proposition 1 to get a characterization theorem for preferences on mixture spaces by using an independence postulate. The preference order satisfies mixture independence if for all a, b, and c in C, and all r ∈ (0, 1], a b iff ra + (1 − r)c rb + (1 − r)c. The preference relation satisfies rational mixture independence if it satisfies mixture independence for all rational r ∈ (0, 1]. 
Similarly, if ra + (1 − r)c rb + (1 − r)c, then applying extended mixture cancellation to the same sequence of acts shows that a b.
For the converse, suppose that is reflexive, transitive, and satisfies rational mixture independence. Suppose that a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n are sequences of of elements of C such that a 1 + · · · + a n = b 1 + · · · + b n , a i b i for i = 1, . . . , n − k, a k+1 = . . . = a n , and b k+1 = . . . = b n . Then from transitivity and rational mixture independence we get that
Thus, by transitivity,
By rational mixture independence, it follows that b n a n .
We can strengthen extended mixture cancellation just as we extended cancellation, by defining a statewise version of it appropriate for AA acts (i.e., functions from S to ∆(O)). For completeness, we give the definition here: Definition 9 (Extended Statewise Mixture Cancellation). The preference relation on a set C of AA acts satisfies extended statewise mixture cancellation iff for all pairs of sequences a 1 , . . . , a n and b = b 1 , . . . , b n of elements of C, such that
It turns out that we do not needed extended statewise mixture cancellation. As the following result shows, it follows from extended mixture cancellation.
Proposition 4.
satisfies extended statewise mixture cancellation iff satisfies extended mixture cancellation.
Proof. Clearly if satisfies extended statewise mixture cancellation, then it satisfies extended mixture cancellation. For the converse, suppose that satisfies extended mixture cancellation,
By rational mixture independence (which follows from extended mixture cancellation, by Theorem 3), since a 1 b 1 , we have that (1/n)a 1 +· · ·+(1/n)a n (1/n)b 1 +(1/n)a 2 +· · ·+(1/n)a n . By a straightforward induction (using transitivity, which again follows from extended mixture cancellation), it follows that
Now from mixture independence, it follows that b n a n , as desired.
The cancellation postulate for choices
We use cancellation to get a representation theorem for preference relations on choices. However, the definition of the cancellation postulates for Savage acts and mixtures rely on (Savage) states. We now develop an analogue of this postulate for our syntactic notion of choice.
Definition 10. Given a set T 0 = {t 1 , . . . , t n } of primitive tests, an atom over T 0 is a test of the form t
An atom is a possible complete description of the truth value of tests according to the DM. If there are n primitive tests in T 0 , there are 2 n atoms. Let At(T 0 ) denote the set of atoms over T 0 . It is easy to see that, for all tests t ∈ T and atoms δ ∈ At(T 0 ), and for all state spaces S and standard test interpretations π S , either π S (δ) ⊆ π S (t) or π S (δ)∩π S (t) = ∅. (The formal proof is by induction on the structure of t.) We write δ ⇒ t if the former is the case. We remark for future reference that a standard test interpretation is determined by its behavior on atoms. (It is, of course, also determined completely by its behavior on primitive tests).
Definition 11. An atom δ (resp., test t) is consistent with a theory AX if there exists a state space S and a test interpretation π S ∈ Π AX such that π S (δ) = ∅ (resp., π S (t) = ∅). Let At AX (T 0 ) denote the set of atoms over T 0 consistent with AX.
Intuitively, an atom δ is consistent with AX if there is some state in some state space where δ might hold, and similarly for a test t.
A choice in A can be identified with a function from atoms to primitive choices in an obvious way. For example, if a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 are primitive choices and T 0 = {t 1 , t 2 }, then the choice a = if t 1 then a 1 else (if t 2 then a 2 else a 3 ) can be identified with the function f a such that
• f a (¬t 1 ∧ t 2 ) = a 2 ; and
Formally, we define f a by induction on the structure of choices. If a ∈ A 0 , then f a is the constant function a, and
We consider a family of cancellation postulates, relativized to the axiom system AX. The cancellation postulate for AX (given the language A 0 ) is simply statewise cancellation for Savage acts, with atoms consistent with AX playing the role of states.
A2
′ . If a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n are two sequences of choices in A A 0 ,T 0 such that for each atom δ ∈ At AX (T 0 ), {{f a 1 (δ), . . . , f an (δ)}} = {{f b 1 (δ), . . . , f bn (δ)}}, and there exists some k < n such that a i b i for all i ≤ k, a k+1 = · · · = a n , and b k+1 = · · · = b n , then b n a n .
We drop the prime, and refer to A2 when k = n − 1.
Axiom A2 implies the simple cancellation of the last section, and so the conclusions of Proposition 1 hold: on A will be transitive and reflexive. A2 has another consequence: a DM must be indifferent between AX-equivalent choices.
Proof. Let S = At AX (T 0 ), the set of atoms consistent with AX, let O be A 0 , the set of primitive choices, and define ρ (if t then a 2 else a 3 ) can be identified with the function f a such that
• f a (t)(a 1 ) = 1/2; f a (t)(a 2 ) = 1/2
• f a (¬t)(a 1 ) = 1/2; f a (¬t)(a 3 ) = 1/2.
Formally, we just extend the definition of f a given in the previous section by defining
Consider the following cancellation postulate:
† . If a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n are two sequences of acts in A
for all atoms δ consistent with AX, and there exists k < n such that a i b i for i ≤ k, a k+1 = . . . = a n , and b k+1 = . . . = b n , then b n a n .
Again, A2 † can be viewed as a generalization of A2
′ .
A2 † is analogous to extended statewise mixture cancellation. It may seem strange that we need the cancellation to be statewise, since Proposition 4 shows that extended statewise mixture cancellation is equivalent to extended mixture cancellation. This suggests that we might be able to get away with the following simpler axiom:
. . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n are two sequences of acts in A
and there exists k < n such that a i b i for i = 1, . . . , k, a k+1 = . . . = a n , and b k+1 = . . . = b n , then b n a n .
* is implied by A2 † , but they are not quite equivalent. To get equivalence, we need one more property:
EQUIV says that all that matters about a choice is how it acts as a function from tests to primitive choices. 
For the converse, since
. Applying EQUIV, we conclude that 1/n(a 1 ) + · · · + 1/n(a n ) ∼ 1/n(b 1 ) + · · · + 1/n(b n ). We can now continue as in the proof of Proposition 4.
Representation Theorems
Having discussed our framework, we now turn to the representation theorems. Our goal is to be as constructive as possible. In this spirit we want to require that preferences exist not for all possible acts that can be described in a given language, but only for those in a given subset, henceforth designated C. We are agnostic about the source of C. It could be the set of choices in one particular decision problem, or it could be the set of choices that form a universe for a collection of decision problems. One cost of our finite framework is that we will have no uniqueness results. In our framework the preference representation can fail to be unique because of our freedom to choose different state and outcome spaces, but even given these choices, the lack of richness of C may allow multiple representations of the same (partial) order.
A Representation Theorem for A
By a representation for a preference order on A we mean the following: Definition 14. A preference relation on a set C ⊆ A A 0 ,T 0 has a constructive AXconsistent SEU representation iff there is a finite set of states S, a finite set O of outcomes, a set U of utility functions u : O → R, a set P of probability distributions on S, a subset V ⊆ U × P, a test interpretation π S consistent with AX, and a choice interpretation ρ SO such that a b iff
We are about to claim that satisfies A2
′ if and only if it has a constructive AX-consistent representation. In the representation, we have a great deal of flexibility as to the choice of the state space S and the outcome space O. One might have thought that the space of atoms, At AX (T 0 ), would be a rich enough state space on which to build representations. This is not true when preferences are incomplete. A rich enough state space needs also to account for the incompleteness.
Definition 15. Given a partial order
on a set C of choices, let EX AX ( ) denote all the extensions of to a total order on C satisfying A2.
Our proof shows that we can take S to be At AX (T 0 ) × EX AX ( ). Thus, in particular, if is complete, then we can take the state space to be At AX (T 0 ). We later give examples that show that if is not complete then, in general, the state space must have cardinality larger than that of At AX (T 0 ). While for some applications there may be a more natural state space, our choice of state space shows that we can always view the DM's uncertainty as stemming from two sources: the truth values of various tests (which are determined by the atom) and the relative order of two choices not determined by (which is given by the extension ′ ∈ EX AX ( ) of ). The idea of a DM being uncertain about her preferences is prevalent elsewhere in decision theory; for instance, in the menu choice literature (Kreps 1979) . This uncertainty can be motivated in any number of ways, including both incomplete information and resource-bounded reasoning. Theorem 4 is proved in the appendix. The proof proceeds by first establishing a statedependent representation using A 0 as the outcome space, and then, by changing the outcome space, 'bootstrapping' the representation to an EU representation. This technique shows that, when the state and outcome spaces are part of the representation, there is no difference between the formal requirement for a state-dependent representation and that for a SEU representation. This does not mean that expected utility comes 'for free'; rather, we interpret it to mean that the beliefs/desires formalism that motivates expected utility theory is sensible for the decision problems discussed in this subsection only if the particular outcome space chosen for the representation has some justification external to our theory. We note that if preferences satisfy A1, the theorem requires only the cancellation axiom A2 rather than the stronger A2
There are no uniqueness requirements on P or U in Theorem 4. In part, this is because the state space and outcome space are not uniquely determined. But even if A1 holds, so that the state space can be taken to be the set of atoms, the probability and the utility are far from unique, as the following example shows.
Example 5. Take A 0 = {a, b}, T 0 = {t}, and AX = ∅. Suppose that is the reflexive transitive closure of the following string of preferences:
Every choice in A is equivalent to one of these four, so A1 holds, and we can take the state space to be S * = {t, ¬t}. Let O * = {o 1 , o 2 }, and define ρ 0
is the constant function o 2 . Now define π S * in the obvious way, so that π S * (t) = {t} and π S * (¬t) = {¬t}. We can represent the preference order by using any probability measure p * such that p * (t) > 1/2 and any utility function u * such that u
As Example 5 shows, the problem really is that the set of actions is not rich enough to determine the probability and utility. By way of contrast, Savage's postulates ensure that the state space is infinite and that there are at least two outcomes. Since the acts are all functions from states to outcomes, there must be uncountably many acts in Savage's framework.
The next example shows that without the completeness axiom A1, there may be no representation in which there is only one utility function and the state space is At AX (T 0 ).
Example 6. Suppose that T 0 = ∅, AX = ∅, and A 0 (and hence A) consists of the two primitive choices a and b, which are incomparable. In this case, the smallest state space we can use has cardinality at least 2. For if |S| = 1, then there is only one possible probability measure on S, and so a single utility function ranks a and b.
Since there is only one atom when there are no primitive propositions, we cannot take the state space to be the set of atoms. There is nothing special about taking T 0 = ∅ here; similar examples can be constructed showing that we cannot take the state space to be At AX (T 0 ) for arbitrary choices of T 0 if the preference order is partial. An easy argument also shows that there is no representation where |O| = 1.
This preference relation can be represented with two outcomes and two states.
. Let P be any set of probability measures including the measures p 1 and p 2 such that p 1 (s 1 ) = 1 and p 2 (s 1 ) = 0. Then the expected utility ranking of randomized acts under each p i contains no nontrivial indifference, and the ranking under p 2 is the reverse of that under p 1 . Thus, these choices represent the preference order.
A Representation Theorem for A +
The purpose of this subsection is to show that for the language A + , we can get something much in the spirit of the standard representation theorem for AA acts. The standard representation theorem has a mixture independence axiom and an Archimedean axiom. As we have seen, A2 † gives us rational mixture independence; it does not suffice for full mixture independence. To understand what we need, recall that the standard Archimedean axiom for AA acts has the following form:
While this axiom is both necessary for and implied by the existence of an SEU representation when is complete, the following example describes an incomplete with a multi-probability SEU representation which fails to satisfy Arch.
Example 7. Suppose that S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }. Let a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 be acts such that a i (s j ) gives an outcome of 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Let P consist of all probability distributions p on S such that p(s 1 ) ≥ p(s 2 ) ≥ p(s 3 ). Define by taking a b iff the expected outcome of a is at least as large as that of b with respect to all the probability distributions in P. It is easy to see that a 1 ≻ a 2 ≻ a 3 , but for no r ∈ (0, 1) is it the case that ra 1 + (1 − r 1 )a 3 ≻ a 2 (consider the probability distribution p such that p(s 1 ) = p(s 2 ) = 1/2).
We can think of the Archimedean axiom as trying to capture some continuity properties of . We use instead the following axiom, which was also used by Aumann (1962 Aumann ( , 1964 . If the set of tests has cardinality n and the set of primitive choices has cardinality m, we can identify an act A + with an element of R 2 n m , so the graph of can be viewed as a subset of R 2 n+1 m .
A3. The graph of the preference relation is closed.
As the following result shows, in the presence of A2 † (extended statewise mixture cancellation), A3 implies full mixture independence. Moreover, if we also assume A1, then A3 implies Arch. Indeed, it will follow from Theorem 8 that in the presence of A1 and A2 † , A3 and Arch are equivalent. On the other hand, it seems that Arch does not suffice to capture independence if is a partial order. Summarizing, A3 captures the essential features of the Archimedean property, while being more appropriate if is only a partial order.
Proposition 7. (a) A2
† and A3 imply full mixture independence. (b) A1, A3, and extended mixture cancellation together imply Arch.
Proof. For part (a), suppose that a b, and c is an arbitrary act. By Theorem 3, rational mixture independence holds, so we have ra + (1 − r)c rb + (1 − r)c for all rational r. By A3, we have ra + (1 − r)c rb + (1 − r)c for all real r. Conversely, suppose that ra + (1 − r)c rb + (1 − r)c for some real r. If r is rational, it is immediate from rational mixture independence that a b. If r is not rational, choose a rational r ′ such that 0 < r ′ < r. Then we can find a sequence of rational numbers r n such that r n r converges to r ′ . By rational mixture independence, r n (ra + (1 − r)c) + (1 − r n )c r n (rb + (1 − r)c) + (1 − r n )c. By A3, it follows that r ′ a + (1 − r ′ )c r ′ b + (1 − r ′ )c. Now by rational mixture independence, we have a b, as desired.
For part (b), suppose that a ≻ b ≻ c. Mixture independence (which follows from A2
† and A3, as we have observed) implies that, for all r ∈ (0, 1), a ≻ ra + (1 − r)c. To see that ra + (1 − r)c ≻ b for some r ∈ (0, 1), suppose not. Then, by A1, b ra + (1 − r)c for all r ∈ (0, 1), and by A3, we have that b a, contradicting our initial assumption. The remaining inequalities follow in a similar fashion.
Definition 16. A preference relation on a set
has a constructive AXconsistent SEU representation iff there is a finite set of states S, a finite set O of outcomes, a set U of utility functions u : O → R, a closed set P of probability distributions on S, a closed set V ⊆ U × P, a test interpretation π S consistent with AX, and a choice interpretation ρ SO such that a b iff
In the statement of the theorem, if is a preference relation on a mixture- As in the case of the language A, we cannot in general take the state space to be the set of atoms. Specifically, if A 0 consists of two primitive choices and we take all choices in A + 0 to be incomparable, then the same argument as in Example 6 shows that we cannot take S to be At(T 0 ), and there are no interesting uniqueness requirements that we can place on the set of probability measures or the utility function. On the other hand, if A1 holds, the proof of Theorem 8 shows that, in the representation, the expected utility is unique up to affine transforma-
are both representations of , then there exist constants α and β such that for all acts a ∈ A
Objective Outcomes
In choosing, for instance, certain kinds of insurance or financial assets, there is a natural, or objective, outcome space-in these cases, monetary payouts. To model this, we take the set O of objective outcomes as given, and identify it with a subset of the primitive acts A 0 . Call the languages with this distinguished set of outcomes A A 0 ,T 0 ,O and A + A 0 ,T 0 ,O , depending on whether we allow randomization.
To get a representation theorem in this setting, we need to make some standard assumptions. The first is that there is a best and worst outcome; the second is a state-independence assumption. However, this state-independence assumption only applies to acts in O, but not to all acts.
A4.
There are outcomes o 1 and o 0 such that for all non-null tests t, o 1 t a t o 0 for all a ∈ A 0 .
A5. If t is not null and o, o
In all our earlier representation theorems, it was possible to use a single utility function. A4 and A5 do not suffice to get such a representation theorem. A necessary condition to have a single utility function, if we also want utility to be state independent, is that restricted to O be complete.
A6. restricted to O is complete.
While A5 and A6 are necessary to get a representation with a single utility function, they are not sufficient, as the following example shows. there were a representation of involving a set P of probability measures and a single utility function u. Thus, there would have to be probability measures p 1 and p 2 in P such that a 1 ≻ a 2 according to (p 1 , u) and a 2 ≻ a 1 according to (p 2 , u). It easily follows that p 1 (π S (t)) < 1/2 and p 2 (π S (t)) > 1/2. We can assume without loss of generality (by using an appropriate affine transformation) that u(o 0 ) = 0 and u(o 1 ) = 1. Since o ∼ a 1 , u(o) must be the same as the expected utility of a 1 . But this expected utility is less than 1/2 with p 1 and more than 1/2 with p 2 . This gives the desired contradiction.
Part of the problem is that it is not just the acts in O that must be state independent. Let Note that, even if satisfies A1, the state space has the form At AX (T 0 )×A 0 . The fact that we cannot take the state space to be At AX (T 0 ) is a consequence of our assumption that primitive acts are deterministic. Roughly speaking, we need the extra information in states to describe our uncertainty regarding how the primitive acts not in O can be viewed as functions from states to outcomes in the pre-specified set O. The following example shows that we need the state space to be larger than At AX (T 0 ) in general.
Example 11. Suppose that there are no primitive proposition, so At AX (T 0 ) is a singleton. There are three primitive acts in A 0 : o 1 = $50000, o 0 = $0, and a, which is interpreted as buying 100 shares of Google. Suppose that o 1 ≻ a ≻ o 0 . If there were a representation with only one state, then ρ SO (a) would have to be either o 1 or o 0 , which would imply that a ∼ o 1 or a ∼ o 0 , contradicting our description of . The issue here is our requirement that a primitive choice be represented as a function from states to outcomes. If we could represent a as a lottery, there would be no problem representing with one state. We could simply take u(o 1 ) = 1, u(o 0 ) = 0, and take a to be a lottery that gives each of o 0 and o 1 with probability 1/2.
We prefer not to allow the DM to consider such 'subjective' lotteries. Rather, we have restricted the randomization to acts. The representation theorem would not change if we allowed primitive choice to map a state to a distribution over outcomes, rather than requiring them to be mappings from states to single outcomes (except that we could take the state space to be At AX (T 0 )).
We can easily represent using two states, s 0 and s 1 , by taking a to be the act with outcome o i in state s i , for i = 0, 1. Taking each of s 0 and s 1 to hold with probability 1/2 then gives a representation of . In this representation, we can view s 0 as the state where buying Google is a good investment, and s 1 as the state where buying Google is a bad investment. However, the DM cannot talk about Google being a good investment; this is not part of his language. Another DM might explicitly consider the test that Google is a good investment. Suppose this DM has the same preference relation over primitive acts as in the example, is indifferent between 100 shares of Google and o 1 if the test is true, and is indifferent between 100 shares of Google and o 0 if the test is false. This DM's preference order has exactly the same representation as the first DM's preference order, but now s 0 can be viewed as the atom where the test is false, and s 1 can be viewed as the atom where the test is true.
The second DM can reason about Google being a good investment explicitly, and can talk to others about it.
Nonstandard Hypothesis Interpretations
Many framing problems can be viewed as failures of extensionality, the principle that says that two equivalent descriptions of the same decision problem should lead to the same choices. While this axiom seems appealing, it often fails in laboratory tests. Different descriptions of the same events often give rise to different judgments. Perhaps the best-known example is the medical treatment experiment considered in Example 1, but there are many others. For example, Johnson et al. (1993) found that subjects offered hypothetical health insurance were willing to pay a higher premium for policies covering hospitalization for any disease or accident than they were for policies covering hospitalization for any reason at all.
But what makes two descriptions of events equivalent? In summarizing failures of extensionality, Tversky and Koehler (1994, p. 548) conclude that '. . . probability judgments are attached not to events but to descriptions of events.' In our framework, events are described by tests. Whether two sets of tests are recognized by a DM as semantically equivalent is determined by her world view, that is, her theory AX. For instance, suppose that this year's discussion of the failure of the New York Yankees baseball team involves the hypothesis t 1 , 'they failed because of a weak defense.' One would have to know more baseball than some of our readers surely do to understand that t 1 is equivalent to t 2 ∨ t 3 , where t 2 is 'they had bad pitching', and t 3 is 'they have poor fielding'. Suppose that a DM must make some decisions to remedy the failures of this year's team. How might her decision problem be represented? If t 1 ⇔ t 2 ∨ t 3 is not part of her theory, then the DM's decision problem might be represented by a state space S and a test interpretation π S such that π S (t 1 ) = π S (t 2 ) ∪ π S (t 3 ). On the other hand, if her knowledge of baseball is sufficiently refined (as has often been the case for those actually making such decisions), then t 1 ⇔ t 2 ∨ t 3 will be part of her theory, and so for any state space S and test interpretation π s ∈ Π AX , π S (t 1 ) = π S (t 2 ) ∪ π S (t 3 ).
We are not taking a stand on the normative implications of extensionality failures. Our point is that extensionality and its failure is a product of the theory of the world AX that a DM brings to the decision problem at hand (and how it compares to the experimenter's or modeler's view of the world). One can extend conventional expected utility to state spaces and act spaces that admit failures of extensionality. A failure of extensionality is not inconsistent with the existence of an SEU representation on a suitably constructed state space. Moreover, if we modelers take t 0 ⇔ t 1 to be an axiom that describes the world, but our DM disagrees, then the probability of the set (π S (t 0 )/π S (t 1 )) ∪ (π S (t 1 )/π S (t 0 )) measures the degree of framing bias from the modeler's point of view. It could be used in a modeling exercise to qualify the effect of framing failures in particular decision problems, and in empirical studies to measure the degree of framing bias.
Failures of extensionality are concerned with a semantic issue: Identifying when two descriptions of an event are equivalent. However, the same issue arises with respect to logical equivalence. For instance, suppose act a gives a DM x if ¬((¬t 1 ∧ ¬t 3 ) ∨ (¬t 2 ∧ ¬t 3 )) is true, and y otherwise, and act b gives the DM x if (t 1 ∧t 2 )∨t 3 is true, and y otherwise. Only someone adept at formula manipulation (or with a good logic-checking program) will recognize that acts a and b are equivalent as a matter of logic because the equivalence of the two compound propositions is a tautology. So far we have required that DMs be logically omniscient, and recognize all such tautologies, because we have considered only standard interpretations.
An interpretation π S on a state space S does not have to be standard; all that is required is that it associate with each test a subset of S. By allowing nonstandard test interpretations, we can back off from our requirement that DM's know all tautologies. This gives us a way of modeling failures of logical omniscience and, in particular, resource-bounded reasoning by DMs.
Recall that a standard test interpretation is completely determined by its behavior on the primitive tests. However, in general, there is no similar finite characterization of a nonstandard test interpretation. To keep things finite, when dealing with nonstandard interpretations, we assume that there is a finite subset T * of the set T of all tests such that the only tests that appear in choices are those in T * . (This is one way to model resource-bounded reasoning.) With this constraint, it suffices to consider the behavior of a nonstandard interpretations only on the tests in T * . Let A A 0 ,T * consist of all choices whose primitive choices are in A 0 and whose tests are all in T * .
The restriction to choices in A A 0 ,T * allows us to define the cancellation postulate in a straightforward way even in the presence of nonstandard interpretations.
A truth assignment to T * is just a function v : T * → {true, false}. We can identify an interpretation on S with a function that associates with every state s ∈ S the truth assignment v s such that v s (t) = true iff s ∈ π(t). For a standard interpretation, we can use an atom instead of a truth assignment, since for a standard interpretation, the behavior of each truth assignment is determined by its behavior on primitive propositions, and we can associate with the truth assignment v s that atom δ s such that t is a conjunct in δ s iff v s (t) = true. These observations suggest that we can consider truth assignments the generalization of atoms once we move to nonstandard interpretations. Indeed, if we do this, we can easily generalize all our earlier theorems.
In more detail, we now view a choice as a function, not from atoms to primitive choices, but, more generally, as a function from truth assignments to primitive choices. As before, we take primitive choices to be constant functions. The choice a = if t 1 then a 1 else (if t 2 then a 2 else a 3 ) can be identified with the function f a such that
A truth assignment v is consistent with AX if v(t) = true for all tests t ∈ AX.
With these definitions in hand, all our earlier results hold, with the following changes:
• we replace A A 0 ,T 0 by A A 0 ,T * ;
• we replace 'atoms δ over T 0 ' by 'truth assignment to T * '.
The cancellation axioms are all now well defined. With these changes, Proposition 5 and Theorems 4, 8, and 10 hold with essentially no changes in the proof. Thus, we have representation theorems that apply even to resource-bounded reasoners.
Updating
There is nothing unique about the state space chosen for an SEU representation of a given choice problem. Our representation theorems state that if an SEU representation exists on any given state space and outcome space with test and choice interpretation functions, then preferences satisfy the appropriate cancellation and other appropriate axioms. Our proofs, however, show that (for standard interpretations) we can always represent a choice situation on the state space At AX (T 0 ) × EX AX ( ), or At AX (T 0 ) × A 0 × EX AX ( ) for the objective-outcomes case, so this construction is in some sense canonical.
In our models there are two kinds of information. A DM can learn more about the external world, that is, learn the results of some tests. A DM can also learn more about her internal world, that is, she can learn more about her preferences. This learning takes the form of adding more comparisons to her (incomplete) preference order. To make this precise, given a preference order on a set C ⊆ A A 0 ,T 0 satisfying A2 ′ , let ⊕ (a, b) be the smallest preference order including and (a, b) satisfying A2
′ . (There is such a smallest preference order, since it is easy to see that if ′ and ′′ both extend , include (a, b), and satisfy A2 ′ , then so does
If we take the state space to be At AX (T 0 ) × EX AX ( ), then a DM's preference order conditioning on either new test information or new comparison information can be represented by conditioning the original probability measures. If P is a set of probability distributions on some set S and E is a measurable subset of S, let P | E = {q : q = p( · |E) for some p ∈ P with p(E) > 0}. That is, in computing P | E, we throw out all distributions p such that p(E) = 0, and then apply standard conditioning to the rest. Let P | t = P | π S (t). In the theorems below, we condition on a test t and on a partial order ′ extending . We are implicitly identifying t with the event {δ ∈ At AX (T 0 ) : δ ⇒ t}, and ′ with the set of total orders in EX AX ( ) extending .
Theorem 4c.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, and with a representation of in which S = At AX (T 0 ) × EX AX ( ) and U is a singleton {u}, t is represented by P | t and u, and ⊕ (a, b) is represented by P | ( ⊕ (a, b) ) and u.
Theorem 8c. Under the assumptions of Theorem 8, and with a representation of in which S = At AX (T 0 ) × EX + AX ( ) and U is a singleton {u}, t is represented by P | t and {u}, and ⊗ (a, b) is represented by P | ( ⊗ (a, b) ) and u.
Theorem 10c. Under the assumptions of Theorem 10, and with a representation of in which S = At AX (T 0 ) ×A 0 ×EX + AX ( ) and U is a singleton {u}, t is represented by P | t and u, and ⊗ (a, b) is represented by P | ( ⊗ (a, b) ) and u.
Information in the external world is modeled as a restriction on the set of feasible acts; information in the internal world is adding comparisons to a the preference order. These theorems show that both kinds of information can be modeled within a Bayesian paradigm.
Conclusion
Our formulation of decision problems has several advantages over more traditional formulations.
• We theorize about only the actual observable choices available to the DM, without having states and outcomes, and without needing to view choices as functions from states to outcomes. Indeed, we show that we can determine whether a DM's behavior is consistent with SEU despite not having states and outcomes. In contrast, in many decision theory experiments, when the DM is given a word problem, the experimenter has an interpretation of this problem as a choice among Savage acts. The experimenter is then really testing whether the DM's choices are consistent with decision theory given this interpretation. Thus, a joint hypothesis is being tested. Standard decision theory can be rejected only if the other part of the joint test-that the experimenter and DM interpret represent the word problem with identical Savage acts-is maintained as true. This is unsatisfactory. As we have shown, our approach does place restrictions on choice; thus, our model can be rejected directly by observations of choice between choices observable by the experimenter.
• By viewing choices as syntactic objects, our approach allows us to consider DMs that associate different meanings to the same object of choice. Moreover, that meaning can depend on the DM's theory of the world. A DM might have a theory that does not recognize equivalences between tests, and thus choices, that may be obvious to others. This potential difference between a DM's theory of the world and an experimenter's view of the world provides an explanation for framing effects, while still allowing us to view a DM as an expected utility maximizer. Moreover, since a DM's theory may not contain all of standard propositional logic, we can model resource-bounded DMs who cannot discern all the logical consequences of their choices. The existence of an SEU representation and the presence of framing effects are independent issues once one is free to choose a state space. We have modeled framing as a semantic issue, and it appears in the relationship between states of the world and statements about the world in the DMs language. This refutes the unwritten but oft voiced implication that in the presence of extensionality failures, decision theory is irrelevant.
• Our approach allows us to consider different DMs who use different languages to describe the same phenomena. To see why this might be important, consider two decision makers who are interested in 100 shares of Google stock and money (as in Example 11). Suppose that one DM considers quantitative issues like price/earnings ratio to be relevant to the future value of Google, while the other considers astrological tables relevant to Google's future value.
The DM who uses astrology might not understand price/earnings ratios (the notion is simply not in his vocabulary) and, similarly, the DM who uses quantitative methods might not understand what it means for the moon to be in the seventh house. Nevertheless, they can trade Google stock and money, as long as they both have available primitive actions like 'buy 100 shares of Google' and 'sell 100 shares of Google'. If we model these decision problems in the Savage framework, we would have to think of assets as Savage acts on a common state and outcome space. Our approach does not require us to tie the DM's decision problems together with a common state space. Every DM acts as if she has a state space, but these state spaces may be different. Thus, agreeing to disagree results (Aumann 1976) , which say that DMs with a common prior must have a common posterior (they cannot agree to disagree) no longer hold.
• A fourth advantage of our approach is more subtle but potentially profound. Representation theorems are just that; they merely provide a description of a preference order in terms of numerical scales. Decision theorists make no pretense that these representations have anything to do with the cognitive processes by which individuals make decisions. But to the extent that the language of choices models the language of the DM, we have the ability to interpret the effects of cognitive limitations having to do with the language in terms of the representation. Our approach allows us to consider the possibility that there may be limitations on the space of choices because some sequence of tests is too computationally costly to verify. Our model of nonstandard test interpretations also takes into account a DM's potential inability to recognize that two choices logically represent the same function.
There is clearly still much more to do to develop our approach. We briefly mention a few topics here.
• Learning and dynamic decision-making: Our focus has been on static decision making. Dealing with decision-making over time will require us to consider learning in more detail. Learning in our framework is not just a matter of conditioning, but also learning about new notions (i.e., becoming aware of new tests). Note that considering dynamic decision-making will require us to take a richer collection of objects of choice, a programming language that allows (among other things) sequential actions (do this, then do that, then do that).
• Multi-agent decision making: We have focused on the single-agent case.
As we have suggested in examples, once we move to a multi-agent case, we can consider different agents who may use different languages. There is clearly a connection here between our framework and the burgeoning literature on awareness and its applications to game theory (see, for example, (Feinberg 2004 , Fagin and Halpern 1988 , Halpern 2001 , Halpern and Rêgo 2006 , Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006 , Modica and Rustichini 1999 that needs to be explored.
• Modeling other 'deviations' from rationality: We have shown how our approach can model framing problems as a consequence of the agent having a different theory from the modeler. We believe that our approach can also model other 'deviations' from rationality of the type reported by Luce (1990) , which can be viewed as a consequence of an agent's bounded processing power. This will require us to be able to distinguish programs such as, for example, 2/3(1/4a + 3/4b) + 1/3c = 1/6a + 5/6(3/5b + 2/5c). To do that, we need to give semantics to choices that does not view them as functions from states to distributions over outcomes.
The strategy of 'constructive decision theory' is to use a language to model the DMs statements about the world rather than to insist on Savage's states, construct choices from a given set of primitive objects of choice and propositions in the language, and then to provide semantics for the language and objects of choice in terms of (subjective) states and outcomes. We applied this strategy to choice under uncertainty, but we believe it can be usefully employed in other domains of choice as well, such as intertemporal decision making and interpersonal choice.
If n > 1, since the two multisets are equal, there must be some permutation τ of {1, . . . , n} such that a τ (i) = b i . Let τ j (1) be the result of applying τ j times, beginning with 1. Let k be the first integer such that τ k+1 (1) is either 1 or n. Then we have the situation described by the following table, where the diagonal arrow denotes equality.
Note that we must have k ≤ n − 1. If τ k+1 (1) = 1, then b τ k (i) = a 1 . Thus, the multisets {{a 1 , . . . , a τ k (1) }} and {{b 1 , . . . , b τ k (1) }} must be equal. The sequences that remain after removing {{a 1 , . . . , a τ k (1) }} from the first sequence and {{b 1 , . . . , b τ k (1) }} from the second also provide a counterexample to the cancellation axiom, contradicting the minimality of n. Thus, τ k+1 (1) = n, and we can conclude by transitivity that a 1 a n .
Continuing on with the iteration procedure starting with a τ k+2 (1) = a τ (n) = b n , we ultimately must return to a 1 and b 1 , as illustrated in the following table: a 1 and b 1 .
It follows from transitivity that b n a 1 . By another application of transitivity, we conclude that b n a n . This contradicts the hypothesis that the original sequence violated the cancellation axiom.
We now prove the representation theorems: Theorems 4, 8, and 10. They all use essentially the same technique. It is convenient to start with Theorem 8. 
for all u ∈ U. Moreover, also satisfies A1 iff we can take U to be a singleton {u}. In this case, u is unique up affine transformations: if u ′ also satisfies (2), then there exist α and β such that u ′ = αu + β.
Proof. In the totally ordered case, this result is well known. Indeed, for a preference order that satisfies A1, Proposition 7.4 of (Kreps 1988) shows that such a representation holds iff satisfies Arch, mixture independence, transitivity, and reflexivity. Theorem 3 and Proposition 7 show that if satisfies extended cancellation and A3, then these properties hold, so there is a representation. Conversely, if there is such a representation, then all these properties are easily seen to hold. It follows that in the presence of A1, extended cancellation and A3 are equivalent to these properties. However, since we do not want to assume A1, we must work a little harder. Fortunately, the techniques we use will be useful for our later results.
To see that the existence of a representation implies Extended Mixture Cancellation and A3, first consider Extended Mixture Cancellation, and suppose that a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 . . . , b n are such that a 1
Since a 1 + · · · + a n = b 1 + · · · + b n , for all s ∈ S, it must be that, for all u ∈ U,
Thus, for all u ∈ U,
Since a k+1 = . . . = a n and b k+1 = . . . = b n , it easily follows that, for all u ∈ U, s∈S u(s, a n (s)) ≤ s∈S u(s, b n (s)).
Thus b n a n , as desired. The fact that A3 holds is straightforward, and left to the reader.
For the 'if' direction, recall that we can view the elements of C as vectors in R |S|×|O| . For the rest of this proof, we identify elements of C with such vectors. Let D = {a − b : a, b ∈ C}, and let
|S|×|O| is a set CC that is closed under nonnegative linear combinations, so that if c 1 , c 2 ∈ CC and α, β ≥ 0, then αc 1 + βc 2 ∈ CC. We need the following lemma. 
∈ D, and α 1 , . . . , α n ≥ 0. Thus, there must exist a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n , a, b ∈ C such that a − b = d, a i − b i = d i , and a i b i for i = 1, . . . , n. We want to show that d ∈ D + or, equivalently, that a b. Let r = α 1 +· · ·+α n +1. Since C is mixture-closed, both (α 1 /r)a 1 +· · ·+(α n /r)a n +(1/r)b ∈ C and (α 1 /r)b 1 +· · ·+(α n /r)b n +(1/r)a are in C. Moreover, since α 1 d 1 +· · ·+α n d n = d and a i b i for i = 1, . . . , n, it easily follows from mixture independence (which is a consequence of extended mixture cancella- 
To prove Theorem 8, the following lemma, which shows that we can identify complete preference orders with half-spaces, is also useful. Given a subset R of R |S|×|O| , define the relation R on C by taking a R b iff a − b ∈ R. 
suppose that a 1 + · + a n = b 1 + · + b n , and a i H b i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Thus, u · (a 1 + · + a n ) = u · (b 1 + ·b n ), and u · (a i − b i ) ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. It follows that (b n − a n ) · u ≥ 0, so b n H a n . Finally, for A3, it is clear that if (a n , b n ) → (a, b), For the converse, suppose that satisfies A2 † and A3. Take S = At AX (T 0 ) and O ′ = A 0 . Define π S (t) to be the set of all atoms δ in At AX (T 0 ) such that δ ⇒ t. Define ρ 0 SO ′ (a) to be the constant function a for a primitive choice a. It is easy to see that ρ SO ′ (a) = f a for all choices a ∈ C. Define a preference relation S on the AA acts of the form ρ SO ′ (a) by taking f a S f b iff a b. The fact that S is well defined follows from Proposition 5, for if f a = f a ′ , then it easily follows that a ≡ AX a ′ , so a ∼ a ′ . Clearly S satisfies extended statewise cancellation, and satisfies A1 iff does. Thus, by Theorem 12, there is an additively separable representation of . Now we adjust the state and outcome spaces to get a constructive SEU representation. Suppose first that A1 holds. Take S = At AX (T 0 ) and take O = At AX (T 0 ) × A 0 . For a primitive choice a ∈ A 0 , define ρ 0 SO (a)(δ) = (δ, a). To complete the proof, it clearly suffices to find a probability measure p on At AX (T 0 ) and a utility function v on At AX (T 0 ) × A 0 such that u(δ, a) = p(δ)v(δ, a), where u is the state-dependent utility function whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 12. This is accomplished by taking any probability measure p on At AX (T 0 ) such that for all atoms δ, p(δ) > 0, and taking v(δ, a) = u(δ, a)/p(δ).
If A1 does not hold, then proceed as above, using Theorem 12 to get an entire set U ′ of functions u : At AX (T 0 ) × A 0 → R, and a single probability distribution p that assigns positive probability to every atom. Let U consist of all utility functions u such that there exists some u ′ ∈ U ′ such that u(α, δ) = u ′ (δ, a)/p(δ). In this representation, again, the state space is At AX (T 0 ).
We now give a representation using a single utility function.
Let S ′ = At AX (T 0 ) × EX AX ( ), and let O ′′ = At AX (T 0 ) × A 0 × EX AX ( ). Define ρ 0 S ′ O ′′ (a)(δ, ′ ) = (δ, a, ′ ). For t ∈ T 0 , define π S ′ (t) = π S (t) × EX AX ( ). As before, let U ′ be the set of utility functions on At AX (T 0 ) × A 0 that represent . Lemma 2 shows that U ′ consists of one utility function u ′ for every total order ′ ∈ EX AX ( ). Again, fix a probability measure p on At AX (T 0 ) such that p(δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ At AX (T 0 ). For each relation ′ ∈ EX AX ( ), define p ′ on At AX (T 0 ) × EX AX ( ) by taking p ′ (δ, ′′ ) = p(δ) if ′ = ′′ , and p ′ (δ, ′′ ) = 0 if ′ = ′′ . Let P = {p ′ :
′ ∈ EX AX ( )}. Define v(δ, a, ′ ) = u ′ (δ, a)/p(δ). It is easy to see that P × {v} represents . Moreover, it easily follows that, with this representation, t and ⊕ (a, b) can be represented by updating. Now we show how the ideas in this proof can be modified to prove Theorems 4 and 4c.
Proof of Theorems 4 and 4c. Again, it is easy to check that if there is a constructive SEU representation of , then satisfies A2 ′ .
For the converse, given a preference relation that satisfies A2
′ . The structure of the proof is identical to that of Theorem 8. We first prove an analogue of Theorem 12. b i for i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that {{a 1 , . . . , a 1 , . . . , a n , . . . , a n , b, . . . , b}} = {{b 1 , . . . , b 1 , . . . , a n , . . . , a n , b, . . . , b}}, where a i occurs in the left-hand multiset β i times and b occurs β n+1 times, and, similarly, b i occurs in the right-hand side β i times and a occurs β n+1 times. A2
′ now implies that a b, so d ∈ CC , as desired.
The proof of Theorem 13 is now identical to that of Theorem 12. Moreover, the proof of Theorem 4 now follows from Theorem 13 in exactly the same way that the proof of Theorem 8 follows from Theorem 12.
Proof of Theorems 10 and 10c. First, let S = At AX (T 0 ) and O ′ = A 0 . As in the proof of Theorem 8, using Theorem 12, we can find an additively separable representation of ; that is, we can find a set U of utility functions on S = At AX (T 0 ) × A 0 that represent . Let o 1 and o 0 denote the best and worst outcomes guaranteed to exist by A4. Note that it follows from A4 and A5 that u(δ, o 0 ) ≤ u(δ, a) ≤ u(δ, o 1 ) for all (δ, a) ∈ S. (For null atoms δ, we must in fact have u(δ, o 0 ) = u(δ, a) = u(δ, o 1 ) for all a ∈ A 0 ). Furthermore, note that we can replace u by u ′ , where u ′ (δ, a) = u(δ, a) − u(δ, o 0 ) for all (δ, a) ∈ S to get an equivalent representation; thus, by appropriate scaling, we can assume without loss of generality that, for all u ∈ U, we have that u(δ, o 0 ) = 0 for all δ ∈ At AX (T 0 ) (so u(δ, a) ≥ 0 for all (δ, a) ∈ S) and that δ ′ ∈At AX (T 0 ) u ′ (δ ′ , o 1 ) = 1. Let p ′ be defined so that p ′ (δ, a, ′′ ) = 0 and, for all a ∈ A 0 , p ′ ({(δ, a ′ , ′ ) : a ′ a ′ }) = u ′ (δ, a). It is easy to check that a probability measure p ′ can be defined so as to satisfy this constraint. In particular, note that p ′ ({δ}×A 0 ×{ ′ }) = u ′ (δ, o 1 ). For all (δ, a) ∈ S, we have that
.
It follows that P and u represent , where P = {p ′ : ′ ∈ EX + AX ( )}. As usual, it is straightforward to verify that updating works appropriately.
